Air crisis in Brazil
Until September 29th 2006, Brazil seemed to have a reasonable aerial transportation system. Two private airlines (TAM and Gol) concentrating nearly 80% of the market; a State company (Infraero) managing the airports; a sector of the Minister of Defense controlling radars and air traffic, including civil transportation; an independent agency (ANAC - Agencia Nacional de Aviação Civil) overlooking the system, to guarantee that the best techniques are applied and the Government goals are met.
Then, on September 29th 2006, a Boeing and a jet collided in Brazilian air; that had been the biggest air accident in Brazil, with 154 dead people (update: in July 2007, an yet bigger air accident killed nearly 200 people in São Paulo).
And then, in a time frame of just a couple of months, Brazilians found out that:
- the air controllers (most of them Sargents of Air Force), besides being overbusy and underpaid, work under stressful conditions. Because they are Military, they have to respect hierarchy; there is very little room to protest against bad working conditions. A sargent gets paid about R$ 2.000 or US$ 1.000; because they are sargents, they have to get a sargent’s salary, not an air controller salary. Because of shortage of staff, an air controller in Brazil had to control up to 20 aircrafts simultaneously, while their colleagues in Europe or USA control about 10 aircrafts. Because they get low salaries and because the Government doesn’t invest in their education, many air controllers speak no more than basic English.
- the air companies are too mean. TAM and GOL benefited from the fact that three large air companies failed in just a couple of years: Vasp, Transbrasil and Varig. TAM and GOL gained large shares of the market (which grew quickly the recent years), but didn’t invest accordingly. Instead of buying more airplanes, they decided to optimize the use of the current ones; every aircraft should fly as long as possible, and should stay on ground as short as possible. That means that an aircraft could start the day in the North of Brazil, hop around ten cities (where passengers would make connections to their destinations) and finish the day in the South; this obviously also means that, if there is any delay in any city, all the rest of the schedule would be compromised. Also to optimize the usage of their fleet, airlines were renting spare aircrafts (which should be used in emergency situations) to charter companies.
- Infraero is inapt and corrupt. Infraero collects some of the most expensive boarding taxes in the World, but don’t invest them wisely. Several airports received cosmetic improvements, whereas major airports didn’t receive necessary improvements in infrastructure; Brazilian airports are not equiped with ILS3 (Instruments Landing System Class 3 - read more here), a guidance system which allows a pilot to land an airplane safely without even seeing the runway; instead, Brazil still uses ILS2, which obliges several airports to shut down when there is a haze (and the word Cumbica, name of the biggest Brazilian airport, means ‘place of haze’ in Indian language).
- the Control System is faulty. Air controllers said that the radars are obsolete, and lack proper maintenance. TV news exhibited (anonymous) air controllers in the control room showing the existence of shadow zones (where the airplanes lose contact with ground), particularly in the Amazon area. Newspapers showed that, to save money, the Government hasn’t spent the funds allowed by the budget toward air security.
- there is a serious conflict between Military and civilians. The air controllers are military, but they are not happy with such situation; as Military, they are prohibited by law to express dissatisfaction. One of the main demands of the controllers (besides higher salaries) is to declared civil servants, but this goes against the High Command of the Armed Forces. In the beginning of the crisis, civilian Minister of Defense Waldir Pires attempted to negotiate with the controllers, but this was seen as a breach of hierarchy by the officials, and the negotiations were not respected. The controllers threatened the Government with more chaos in the airports, the Military warned Lula of the dissatisfaction among the Generals; Lula doesn’t know what to do.
- There is a big lack of administrative competence. There are several people and agencies involved in the regulation of the air traffic (Infraero, ANAC, Minister of Defense, and above all the President of the Republic), but none can offer solutions. From the beginning of the crisis in September 2006 until July 2007, no solution had been proposed, and nobody had lost their job.
Below, a cronogram of a few relevant facts regarding the air crisis in Brazil. The blog Apagão Aéreo maintains a more detailed report.
- October 26th 2006. The air controllers show their force for the first time. The investigations (actually, more rumors than facts) about the air crash were indicating that the air controllers on duty on the day of the accident could be considered, at least in part, guilty. The air controllers said that they had been doing more than their duties, and refused to be the escaping goat of this problem.
Starting October 26th, through the Holiday on November 2nd, the air controllers entered into ’standard operation’ mode (in Portuguese, the expression is ‘operação padrão’). The air controllers decided that they would firmly adhere to every security norm, following every standard determined by international air security bodies; as a consequence, the number of airplanes flying at any given time had to decrease.
This caused long lines in the passenger halls and in the aircraft yards of the airports. Pilots only were authorized to take off after another plane landed, somewhere. Then unused with the situation, passengers didn’t know what to do, other than complaining and waiting.
- December 5th 2006. The radio system of the Air Control Center in Brasilia failed. The radio system stopped working for one hour in the morning and for two hours in the afternoon. The airport of Brasilia was shut down. Because many flights start or end their trip in Brasilia, the air traffic all across the country became chaotic again. There were rumors of sabotage by the air controllers, but they said that the entire radar and radio infrastructure is mis-maintained, and new failures should be expected.
- November 2nd. The Minister of Defense, Waldir Pires, meets the leaders of the air controllers (because air controllers are Military, they can’t create Unions; there are only informal leaders). Waldir Pires said he didn’t know that the controllers worked under such high stress, and promised to take measures to help them. The meeting was not well seen by the Commandes of Air Forces (who are subordinated to the Minister of Defense), because any concession made to the air controllers would be seen as a privilege in detriment of the rest of the Military.
- Christmas 2006. The chaos is back again, at the peak of the Christmas holiday season. There were rumors that the air controllers were unsatisfied because Waldir Pires didn’t fulfill his promises and entered standard mode again. There were even stronger rumors that TAM had practiced overbooking and also rented some spare aircrafts (which should be saved for emergency situations) to companies which operate charter flights. Below, video of the Brasilia airport:
- March 21st 2007. Another Air Control Center fails, this time the Cindacta 2, in Curitiba. The chaos returned to the airports of Brazil. President Lula declared: “I want (to be given) a deadline; I want (to be given) a day and time for me to announce to Brazil that there will be no more problems in the airports”. The President didn’t say to whom his ultimatum was directed; nobody gave him any deadline.
- March 30th. While President Lula was flying out to USA to meet President Bush, the air controllers openly declared to be on a strike (even though this is against the law). The air controllers were demanding the fulfillment of promises made by Minister Waldir Pires in November of 2006. President Lula ordered Minister of Planning, Paulo Bernardo, to meet the strikers; Paulo Bernardo talked with the controllers, promised again that their demands would be satisfied, and assured, in the name of President, and much to the dismay of the Military Ministers, that there would be no punishments to anyone because of the illegal strike.
- April 5th. After Lula returned to Brazil, the Military Ministers said that the promises made by Paulo Bernardo were unbearable. Lula breaks his own promises, and says that hierarchy and law should prevail (actually, from the start, Lula’s promises didn’t mean anything; the controllers committed crimes, and should respond for them, regardless of Lula’s thoughts; eventually, the leaders of the rebellion were prosecuted). With the episode, Lula lost any trust he might have from the controllers.
- June 9th.
Because of rain, smog and haze, the airports of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre had to close for a few hours during a few days. Because the air grid is highly optimized, any delay in a major airport propagates across the country. Those people who asked themselves why the smog doesn’t stop flights in other countries learned then that Brazilian airports do not have an Instrument Landing System which make an aircraft capable of landing without even seeing the ground.
On the occasion, when asked in an interview what she suggested the passengers do, the Minister of Tourism, Marta Suplicy, pronounced an Historic phrase: “Relax and enjoy it” (the next day, the Minister apologized).
- July 17th. Another major accident. An airbus landing at the airport Congonhas in São Paulo can’t stop and crashes against a building, killing 199 people.
- July 18th. Several days of chaos. The main runway in Congonhas is closed. Several flights are canceled, several are transferred to Cumbica airport; the problem is that nobody knows which is which. As usual, the chaos in São Paulo propagates all across the country. At the moment, the President and his crew are more concerned with keeping away from the accident to preserve their images than with finding solutions to the air problem.
- July 24th. The online version of The Economist published an article about the situation in Brazil with the headline: “From crisis to crisis in Brazil : A woeful aviation industry exposes wider regulatory troubles”.
July 26th. President Lula appointed a new Minister of Defense: Nelson Jobim. Newspaper say that Jobim had been invited on two occasions to take this job, but he had refused. To accept the job this time, Jobim demanded a carte blanche; that means that there may be deep changes in Infraero, ANAC, air controllers, the federal budget, etc.
Nélson Jobim was a Federal Deputy during the Constituent Assembly of 1988; he was Minister of Justice of the Government Fernando Henrique Cardoso; he was Justice of the Supreme Court until 2005, when he retired (there were strong rumors that he would be candidate to vice-President of President Lula in 2006, but this didn’t happen).
- Aug. 2nd. Nelson Jobim announced that the air grid in Brazil will be reformmated. Today, Congonhas is the main hub in Brazil. With the new plan, the load on Congonhas will be distributed to several other airports: Brasilia would be hub for flights to North and Northeast; Confins, flights to Northeast; Cumbica, in São Paulo, and Tom Jobim, in Rio, flights to South, North, Europe and North America. Congonhas would keep the air bridge with Rio and flights no longer than two hours.
This re-arrangement of planes and routes will increase costs of airlines, and should result in increase of prices. This will be one (probably the most important) factor in solving the crisis: by increasing prices, the number of passengers will decrease, easing the pressure on the weak infrastructure. It should be the interest of the airlines to announce a possible increase in prices, but Infraero did this dirty job for them and already warned passengers about price hikes; Nelson Jobim said that he “will not tolerate abuses”.
- August 4th. Minister Nelson Jobim appointed a new President to Infraero. The new President, Sergio Gaudenzio, is an engineer who left the Presidency of the Brazilian Aerospace Agency to take over Infraero.
Jobim doesn’t hide that he wants to change the entire board of ANAC. Veja #2020 published a report affirming that the Directors of ANAC received many gifts from the air companies, such as unlimited free tickets. The problem is that the directors of ANAC (and all other regulatory agencies) have fixed terms, and can’t be dismissed by the President.
- August 8th. The National Council of Justice determined the creation of small claim courts in the major airports in Brazil.
Brazilian legislation grants some rights to customers which have not been honored by the air companies. For example, if a flight delays more than four hours, the company must pay for food and accommodation to passengers. The problem today is that passengers don’t know where to go to seek for help (Infraero, ANAC, Police); the idea is that passengers should now go to the small claim courts.
- August 16th. Denise Abreu speaks to the Probing Comission. Denise Abreu is one of the main directors of ANAC. She is a lawyer, with no experience in aeronautics; she was appointed to ANAC because she was advisor of José Dirceu, then chief of Staff of President Lula (the case of the President of ANAC, Zuanazzi, is even worse: ex-Secretary of Tourism in Rio Grande do Sul, he became President of the Agency because he is friend of current chief of Staff Dilma Russef). Against all evidences, Denise said that she has no responsibility for the chaos or the accidents, and she will not resign.
- August 21st. ANAC lied to Justice. Earlier this year, Judge CecÃlia Marcondes had ordered the closing of Congonhas, because technical reports indicated that the runway was too short to support landing of big aircrafts. ANAC sent several documents to show that the airport was safe, including a Resolution by which only aircrafts with fully working reversors would be allowed to land under wet weather. In the hearing before the Probing Comission last week, Denise Abreu admited that that Resolution had not been officially passed to the air companies, so that norm (about reversors) had not to be obeyed by the companies. Newspapers are saying that ANAC lied to the Judge, to convince her to authorize the re-opening of the airport.
